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We develop a theoretical model to study the effects of libertarian paternalism on knowledge acquisition
and social learning. Individuals in our model are permitted to appreciate and use the information content
in the default options set by the government. We show that in some settings libertarian paternalism
may decrease welfare because default options slow information aggregation in the market. We also
analyze what happens when the government acquires imprecise information about individuals, and
characterize its incentives to avoid full disclosure of its information to the market, even when it has
perfect information. Finally, we consider a market in which individuals can sell their information to
others and show that the presence of default options causes the quality of advice to decrease, which
may lower social welfare.
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Libertarian paternalism, as posed by Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008), is arguably one of the
most provocative policy contributions in the last two decades. Its beauty stems from its link
between two ideas that are on the surface contradictory, but may indeed be an uncompromising
compromise. Libertarian paternalism allows a social planner to direct market participants through
default options without imposing his will, so that everyone may enjoy the best of both worlds:
guidance without the tax of obtrusion.
Not everyone agrees that such a policy is innocuous. For example, Glaeser (2006) argues
that libertarian paternalism may also cause bad decisions, is harder to publicly monitor, and
may inevitably lead to hard paternalism. Korobkin (2009) argues that, even though libertarian
paternalism may induce individuals to make optimal decisions for themselves, collective welfare may
decrease. These objections raise an obvious question: When do we expect libertarian paternalism
to be welfare improving?
To explore this, we analyze an important dimension of this debate: the eﬀect of libertarian
paternalism on information acquisition and social learning. We know from Madrian and Shea (2001)
that default options provide information to market participants, which may change both their
perceptions and resultant actions. Such intervention also impacts the eﬀectiveness of learning
through social interaction (e.g., Duﬂo and Saez, 2003). So, if learning from others and incentives
to acquire information decrease suﬃciently when people are guided by a social planner, whether
they are forced to make choices or not, total welfare may decrease. This implies that in some
circumstances it may be optimal to either implement a limited form of libertarian paternalism or
to leave market participants alone, even if some people’s choices end up regrettably suboptimal.
We characterize some settings in which providing default options may decrease welfare because
information acquisition and aggregation slows. We do this both when information percolates ac-
cording to a social learning technology (e.g., Duﬃe and Manso, 2007) and in a market setting in
which informed participants can sell their information to others.
In the model that we analyze, there is a continuum of heterogeneous individuals, who each share
a common characteristic that is known by the government. The government has to decide whether
to disclose this information through a default option or to keep the information to themselves.
Individuals may also exert costly eﬀort to ﬁnd out their own types, which includes the government’s
information, so that they make an even better decision. As a group, higher aggregate eﬀort also
decreases the costs for any one individual to become informed. This form of social learning provides
1an externality where one individual’s eﬀort aﬀects other peoples’ welfare and vice versa.
We derive conditions under which default options are optimal and describe when they destroy
social surplus. When the information-sharing technology is suﬃciently eﬀective, the cost of in-
formation acquisition is low, and/or the agent-speciﬁc information is more valuable, providing a
default option is suboptimal. Under these conditions, a social planner maximizes welfare by letting
market participants fend for themselves and allowing social learning to take place. Alternatively,
if the information known by the planner is relatively more valuable and these other conditions do
not hold, then default options add value.
This sheds light on when libertarian paternalism is likely to add value. Default options are likely
to be welfare-improving when individuals are homogeneous. For example, consider the default
option of organ donation following a lethal car accident. There is little variation in the quality
of healthy organs from diﬀerent individuals following an accident. In this case, donation as a
default is likely to add value. Default options are also likely to be welfare-improving when the
information acquired by the planner is relatively valuable compared to the information gathered by
individuals. This motivates why default options to participate in a 401(k) retirement plan are so
useful. However, default options are unlikely to increase social welfare when peoples’ needs are more
heterogeneous or when the information acquired by individuals is relatively valuable compared to
the information contained in the default option. An example of this may be portfolio allocation
problems. If providing defaults for this decision decreases some peoples’ incentives to become savvy,
this may lead to a drop in welfare.
We proceed to consider what happens when the government acquires imperfect information
about its constituents. In this case, systematic errors decrease the accuracy for people who use the
default options, but increase the eﬀort that individual’s employ to acquire and aggregate informa-
tion. We show that the latter eﬀect dominates the former in that issuing no default is more likely
to be of value when the government’s information is imperfect. Therefore, our analysis addresses
the objection raised by Glaeser that social planners are not immune from making errors or having
biases.
Given this, we then consider whether the government would ever want to issue an imperfect
default even though they have perfect information. We show this not to be the case. That is,
despite being given a broader action space including noisy defaults, the government’s optimal
choice is binary: either issue a fully informative default option or leave individuals to fend for
themselves. The same comparative statics still hold as before, which supports the generality of our
ﬁndings.
2Finally, we characterize a market in which information sales are allowed to take place. A frac-
tion of the population are recognized as information gatherers (e.g., brokers in ﬁnancial markets),
whereas the remainder rely on advice markets for guidance. The government faces the same prob-
lem as before, and information gatherers decide how much costly eﬀort to employ in accumulating
knowledge. The diﬀerence here is that there is no social learning technology. Rather, information
gatherers may sell their information to the rest of the public for a price. In this version of the
model, the presence of a default option decreases the value of advice. That is, since fewer infor-
mation gatherers will become knowledgeable, the quality of advice in the market suﬀers. As in the
base model, not oﬀering a default option dominates issuing a default option if the cost of eﬀort
is low and the value of agent-speciﬁc (government) information is high (low). This ﬁnding is not
dependent on market power, that is, whether the industry is competitive or the advisors have local
monopoly power.
The analysis in this paper contributes to the literature on the distortions of paternalism, whether
hard or soft (i.e., libertarian paternalism).1 Bentham (1781) and Hayek (1945) argue that despite
the best intentions of a social planner, individuals have both an advantage in gathering precise in-
formation about themselves and a greater incentive to do so. As such, any policy that impedes such
progress is welfare decreasing. More recently, hard paternalism has been studied by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2003, 2006) who analyze the unintended consequences of sin taxes. Likewise, Camerer
et al. (2003) study a form of asymmetric paternalism to minimize such distortions. As mentioned
previously, with the recent advent of soft paternalism (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2003), several
critics have been wary of unintended consequences induced by such policies (e.g., Glaeser 2006; Ko-
robkin, 2009; Zanitelli, 2009). Our analysis adds to this literature by showing when and where soft
paternalism is likely to work and when it is likely to destroy social surplus. Consistent with Ben-
tham (1781) and Hayek (1945), if the knowledge of the government pales in importance compared
to what individuals need to know about themselves, libertarian paternalism is likely to be subopti-
mal. However, if people are more homogeneous and the government’s information is accurate and
valuable, employing soft paternalism is optimal.
Our work also builds on the work by Carroll et al. (2008) who study optimal default options in a
dynamic model, given that individuals tend to procrastinate in making important decisions. They
show that default options can function as a control device: when individuals have a hyperbolic
discount function, oﬀering a biased default induces people to opt out and make educated decisions
sooner. Our focus in this paper is obviously diﬀerent. We consider that there is information content
1See Amir and Lobel (2009) for a recent review of this literature.
3in default options, and that this may eﬀect information acquisition and aggregation by people in
the market. We show that the government will either issue a fully informative default or no default
at all, but never discloses only a portion of their information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our basic model and
determines when it is optimal to use default options. In Section 2.1, we consider that the government
can only issue fully informative default options, whereas in Section 2.2 we consider imperfect default
options. In Section 3, we allow for information sales. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Social Learning
2.1 Basic Model
The economy is composed of a government and a continuum (a non-atomic ﬁnite measure space
(I,I,γ)) of heterogeneous, rational individuals who all face a signiﬁcant economic decision. Exam-
ples of such a decision might be an investment-consumption choice, a capital allocation decision, or
a choice of insurance. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we set the total measure γ(I)
of individuals to 1 (i.e., a unit mass).
The ex post utility from the decision for each individual i ∈ I is given by
˜ Ui(xi) = −(˜ τi − xi)2, (1)
where xi ∈ R is a choice variable and ˜ τi is the individual’s true type. The type ˜ τi is the sum a
component ˜ g that is common to all individuals and an idiosyncratic component ˜ ti that is speciﬁc to
individual i. We assume that ˜ g and ˜ ti are two independent normally distributed random variables,
each with zero mean and respective variances Σg and Σt, and that Cov(˜ ti,˜ tj) = ρΣt, with ρ ∈ [0,1),
for any {i,j} ∈ I2 with i  = j.2 Thus, for each individual i, ˜ τi is normally distributed with a mean of
zero and a variance of Στ ≡ Σg +Σt. As (1) is a quadratic loss function, the goal of each individual
is to choose xi to be as close to ˜ τi as possible in order to minimize the expected loss that they
suﬀer.
Before choosing xi, each individual i can exert some eﬀort in order to improve the probability
that he ﬁnds out about his own type. An individual who selects an eﬀort level ei ∈ [0,1] observes
his true type ˜ τi (i.e., receives an informative signal) with probability ei, and observes nothing
otherwise. Individuals know when they did not receive an informative signal. An individual’s eﬀort
2Note that the positive correlation across the idiosyncratic component ti of individuals’ types does not play a role
until we allow for information sales, in section 3.





i − α¯ e2), (2)
where ¯ e ≡
R
I eidγ, α ∈ [0,1), and c is a positive constant. Given that ¯ e represents the average eﬀort
exerted by individuals in the population, the cost speciﬁcation in (2) implies that it is cheaper to
learn one’s own type when many individuals seek to learn theirs. This positive externality of eﬀort
captures the idea that as more people exert eﬀort and more of the population becomes informed,
their interactions lead to more spillovers in the learning process that ultimately make it easier
for anyone to learn about the economic decision that they have to make. While not speciﬁcally
modeled, the micro-foundation for this setup might be a model of search in which the distance
that a person travels to gather information decreases as more of the population is informed. The
parameter α measures the degree of this information externality.
The government costlessly observes the common component ˜ g of the individual’s types. For
example, this could correspond to the government having an informed opinion about the optimal
average savings rate for a group of individuals. The government then chooses whether to set a
default option that takes ˜ g into account or to leave individuals to their own devices. Its goal in
this choice is to maximize total welfare. Since individuals are rational, they are able to glean
information about ˜ g from a default option if it is oﬀered.3,4 This, in turn, will aﬀect their choice of
eﬀort in gathering further information.
Let Si denote the information set of an individual i at the time he must make his decision xi.
This set is equal to {˜ τi} if the individual observes his true type, whether or not the government
sets a default option.5 When there is a default option and the individual does not observe his type,
Si = {˜ g}. Finally, when there is no default option and the individual does not observe his type,
Si = ∅. The following lemma deﬁnes the optimal choice of xi, given the information set Si.
Lemma 1. The optimal choice of xi for individual i is E
￿
˜ τi | Si
￿
.
With a default option, each individual i who observes an informative signal opts out of the
default and chooses xi = ˜ τi, whereas any individual who remains uninformed does not opt out, i.e.,
3As long as the government’s choice for the default option is one-to-one with ˜ g, every individual can infer ˜ g
perfectly. Thus it is without loss of generality that we assume in what follows that the government announces ˜ g as
the default option when it makes such an option available.
4A key diﬀerence between our model and that of Carroll et al. (2008) is that each individual i is free to extract
the beneﬁt from the information in ˜ g and to use it for his decision xi, without incurring any penalty for not choosing
xi = ˜ g.
5Technically speaking, the information set is {˜ g, ˜ τi} when the government announces a default option and individ-
ual i observes his type, but the additional information provided by ˜ g (i.e., knowing ˜ g and ˜ τi separately) is not useful
for any of the decisions that this individual must make.
5chooses xi = ˜ g, as prescribed by the government. If no default option is oﬀered by the government,
any individual i who becomes informed still chooses xi = ˜ τi, and chooses xi = 0 if they do not get
to observe an informative signal. Consistent with Madrian and Shea’s (2001) empirical ﬁndings,
there is information content in the default options that the government provides, as uninformed
individuals optimally (and rationally) choose to use them.
Before choosing xi but after the government’s decision to announce a default option, each
individual i chooses the eﬀort level ei that maximizes his expected utility. This choice takes into
account the fact that he will subsequently choose xi according to Lemma 1. It also depends on the
individual i’s information set S0
i which is then ˜ g if the government makes a default option available
and is empty otherwise. The following lemma summarizes and simpliﬁes this maximization problem.
Lemma 2. Individual i chooses his eﬀort level ei to maximize
E
h
˜ Ui(xi) − C(ei) | S0
i
i
= −(1 − ei)
h






i − α¯ e2), (3)
where δ = 1 when a default option ˜ g is oﬀered by the government and δ = 0 when people are left to
their own devices.
This result highlights the tradeoﬀ faced by each individual. Eﬀort is costly (second term in (3))
but it reduces the variance that the individual is subject to (ﬁrst term in (3)). At the same time,
the concerted eﬀort of every individual creates a public good, ¯ e, that lowers costs for everyone.
Going forward, we make the following assumption, which guarantees an interior solution to the
eﬀort problem but does not aﬀect the economics of the analysis.
Assumption 1. The cost parameter c is such that c > Σg + Σt.
The following proposition characterizes the eﬀort choice of individuals, with and without a
default option.














6Inspection of (4) and (5) shows that individuals exert more eﬀort with higher Σt and lower c.
That is, the more variance about an individual’s type that is resolved when an informative signal is
obtained and the lower the cost of acquisition, the more eﬀort each individual is willing to employ.














i increases as Σg gets larger and as c gets smaller. Since the positive externality ¯ e comes
from the average eﬀort of people in the economy, it follows that there are greater opportunities
for people to learn from each other when default options are not provided by the government. In
this sense, whether a default option is welfare improving depends on the strength of the learning
externality relative to the value of the information that the government has in its possession.
Given Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, we can compute the total welfare with a default option as
W





and the total welfare without a default option as
W
N = −(Σg + Σt) +
(1 + α)(Σg + Σt)2
2c
. (7)
The next proposition compares welfare with and without a default option.
Proposition 2. The total welfare W
N without a default option is higher than the total welfare W
D
with a default option if the cost parameter c is in the following region:












According to Proposition 2, welfare without a default option may be higher than welfare with
a default option. This arises because the presence of a default option reduces people’s incentives to
learn about the economic problem they face, which in turn slows the pace of information propagation
throughout the economy. In other words the very presence of a default option creates an incentive
for the population to herd into it, a damaging eﬀect when people can learn a lot from each other
(i.e., when α is large), and when the cost of information acquisition is low (i.e., when c is small).
As shown in (9), the availability of a default option is more likely to be detrimental if the portion
7Γ of the volatility that the government can eliminate with its information about ˜ g is small relative
to the extent of information externalities.
To gain further insight into this result, let us use (6) and (7) and deﬁne the diﬀerence
∆W ≡ W
N − W
D = −Σg +
(1 + α)Σg(Σg + 2Σt)
2c
. (10)
Notice that, since Σg = ΓΣτ and Σt = (1 − Γ)Στ, we can rewrite this expression as
∆W = −ΓΣτ +












and this quantity is positive if and only if




That is, an increase in the ability of the government to curb variance by revealing its knowledge of
˜ g through a default option makes this option relatively less appealing when Γ is small or the total
variance Στ is large. In other words, when important information about individuals is unobservable
to the government (small Γ) or when there is a lot of uncertainty about the individuals’ economic
decision (large Στ), increasing the precision of this information makes default options less appealing,
as such options then have a particularly detrimental eﬀect on information gathering incentives, and
in turn on information sharing.





(1 + α)Γ(2 − Γ)Στ
c
, (13)
which is positive if and only if
Στ >
c
(1 + α)(2 − Γ)
.
Thus an increase in overall uncertainty renders the presence of default options detrimental to
welfare when this uncertainty is large to begin with (large Στ) and when the government’s ability
to reduce uncertainty is limited (small Γ). The former eﬀect has two potential interpretations.
First, Στ might proxy for the amount of heterogeneity in the population: when peoples’ needs
or attributes diﬀer a lot, default options are more likely to be suboptimal. Second, Στ might
also proxy for the economic value at risk in each individual’s decision: when decisions are more
8important, the government should refrain from issuing a default in order to promote learning and
information sharing by individuals. The latter eﬀect is directly related to the information gathering
incentives of individuals: an increase in Στ makes the default option damaging when Γ is small
because the importance of the information that individuals forego by exerting less eﬀort to gather
it, (1−Γ)Στ, is large relative to the precision of the information they learn from the default option,
ΓΣτ. Together, these comparative statics suggest venues in which default options are likely to add
value. For instance, default options are more likely to add value when there is little cross-sectional
variation in the population (e.g., healthy organ donations following lethal accidents) than when
this variation is higher (e.g., portfolio allocation problems).
By inspection of (10), the relationship between ∆W and Σg is non-monotonic. Similarly, our
analysis of (12) shows that ∆W is non-monotonically aﬀected by changes in Γ. Based on this, it
is feasible that the government can optimize welfare by limiting its information collection to an
imperfect signal and by oﬀering to the population a default option that is not perfectly correlated
with ˜ g. We explore this next.
2.2 Imperfect Government
One of Glaeser’s (2006) objections to the optimality of libertarian paternalism is that the gov-
ernment may, like individuals, make errors in judgement and decision making. For example, the
government might have limited precision when gathering information about its constituents. In
this case, default options reveal an imperfect, yet unbiased, signal about ˜ g.6 Alternatively, the gov-
ernment may gather perfect information about ˜ g, but wish to disclose an imperfect signal of their
information through a default option. Characterizing these issues is the purpose of this section.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst analyze what happens when the government observes ˜ g imperfectly, and then
consider the government’s incentives to fully disclose ˜ g even when it observes its value perfectly.
Suppose that the government only observes a noisy signal ˜ s = ˜ g + ˜ ǫ, where ˜ ǫ is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance Σǫ, and is independent from ˜ g and ˜ ti for all i ∈ I. As
before, each individual i can exert eﬀort ei for a cost given by (2) and learns his type τi with
probability ei. If the government issues a default option that conveys its noisy signal, rational
6Such mistakes might also result from a systematic bias in the government’s information gathering process. Of
course, since agents in our model are fully rational, they would correctly interpret the information contained in default
options and remove the eﬀects of these systematic biases. With an unbiased, noisy signal about ˜ g, improving precision
is not possible but does induce individuals to employ more eﬀort in acquiring their own information. Therefore, the
model as posed could include a systematic bias, but this would not change the economics of our results. Only if
individuals could not understand and adjust for the government’s biases would such mistakes change the analysis and
lead to lower welfare.
9individuals will take this into account when choosing how much information to acquire and share.
We characterize this eﬀect in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the government implements an imperfect default option with noise Σǫ, each
individual i chooses eﬀort
ei =





Σg+Σǫ. An individual i who observes a fully informative signal opts out of the default
option and chooses xi = ˜ τi = ˜ g + ˜ ti. An individual i who does not become informed chooses
xi = δ˜ s = δ
￿
˜ g + ˜ ǫ
￿
, the default option oﬀered by the government.
As in Proposition 1, the optimal choice of eﬀort is strictly decreasing in c and increasing in Σt
and Σg. Additionally, as the amount of noise in the default increases (higher Σǫ, and thus lower
δ), the higher is the eﬀort that each individual is willing to exert to learn about ˜ τi. Therefore,
the precision of information contained in the default option drives the incentives of individuals to
acquire information, which in turn aﬀects how much is learned via information sharing.
























(1 + α). (15)
The next proposition compares welfare with and without a default option when the government’s
information is imperfect.
Proposition 4. The total welfare W
N without a default option is higher than the total welfare
W
D(Σǫ) with a noisy default option if the cost parameter c is in the following region:
















Σg+Σt and Φ =
Σg
Σg+Σǫ.
Comparing the result in Proposition 4 with that in Proposition 2, the region in which no default
dominates default is larger when the government’s information is imprecise. In fact, Proposition 4
10shows that this region gets larger as Σǫ increases (and Φ decreases). This result is not obvious: an
imprecise default hurts individuals who decide take the default option, but also provides incentives
for individuals to search more intensively, which improves information sharing. Comparison of
Propositions 2 and 4 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second, conﬁrming Glaeser’s (2006)
conjecture that the case for libertarian paternalism is weaker if the government makes errors in
judgement or has imprecise information.
Clearly, this motivates an analysis of whether the government would optimally choose to issue
a noisy default, even when they have (or have free access to) perfect information about ˜ g. Thus
let us consider a broader action space for the government in which it can issue default options that
do not convey a precise signal regarding ˜ g. As such, the government could still choose to issue a
default option that conveys ˜ g perfectly, but we now allow it to instead issue a default option that
conveys ˜ g + ˜ ǫ, in which the government chooses the variance Σǫ > 0 of ˜ ǫ. If a ﬁnite Σǫ is chosen,
individuals can learn some (i.e., incomplete) information about their decision from the default. Of
course, as before, the government can still make the default option perfectly informative about
˜ g by choosing Σǫ = 0, and eﬀectively refrain from making a default option available by choosing
Σǫ = ∞.
Given our previous discussion, the government’s choice of Σǫ aﬀects welfare through two chan-
nels. A higher precision improves the choices that individuals make when they do not observe an
informative signal, but it decreases the incentives of individuals to collect and share information
in the ﬁrst place. Taking these two forces into account, the next proposition characterizes the
government’s optimal default policy.








Proposition 5 implies that our analysis in Section 2.1 holds even when we consider a broader
action space for the government. That is, the government’s decision is eﬀectively binary: it either
chooses a fully informative default option or it oﬀers no default whatsoever. Again, if the cost
of information acquisition is suﬃciently high (high c), the size of the variation or value at risk is
suﬃciently low (low Σg+Σt), or the information sharing technology is suﬃciently weak (low α), the
government issues a fully informative default option (i.e., Σǫ = 0). Otherwise, it lets individuals
fend for themselves (i.e., Σǫ = ∞).
113 Information Sales
So far, our model shows that the adoption of default options is costly and potentially suboptimal
when individuals in the economy can help each other learn about their own type. In this section,
we show that the externality need not be of the form speciﬁed in section 2. In particular, we show
that allowing individuals to sell their information to uninformed individuals can generate similar
results. That is, the presence of default options reduces the incentive for individuals to gather and
resell their information. This leads to an overall reduction of information in the economy and to
lower welfare.
To establish our results, we adapt the basic model of section 2 to a context in which some
individuals can (and will) purchase information from other individuals in the economy. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that a subset I  ∈ I, with γ(I ) =  , of individuals are skilled in the sense
that they can gather information about their type with the same technology as before; that is, for
a cost of C(ei), individual i ∈ I  receives a signal that reveals his ˜ g + ˜ ti with probability ei. To
emphasize the fact that externalities derive purely from information sales, we set α = 0 in (2),
so that C(ei) = c
2e2
i. The other individuals, j ∈ I \ I , are unskilled in the sense that gathering
information about their own type is prohibitively costly.
Instead, these unskilled individuals can purchase information from skilled individuals. Although
everyone’s skill is publicly observable, the private information of any one skilled individual is not.
That is, no one can tell if individual i learned ˜ g + ˜ ti or not. Thus, for a price p (to be determined
shortly), an unskilled individual j can purchase a signal from a skilled individual i, but does not
know if he learns ˜ g + ˜ ti (which is correlated with his own type ˜ g + ˜ tj) or noise (which is not).7
Throughout this section, we go back to the assumption that the government’s default option is
perfect (i.e., equal to ˜ g) when it is made available; that is, we refrain from showing as in section 2.2
that this choice is optimal even if the government can choose the precision of its information. The
following lemma characterizes the value derived from the information by an unskilled individual
who consults a randomly selected skilled individual.
Lemma 3. If the government does not adopt a default option, the maximum amount that an
unskilled individual is willing to pay for the information sold by a randomly selected skilled individual
7We assume that skilled individuals who do not learn their own type sell a randomly drawn number from a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of Σg + Σt, which makes it impossible for information buyers to tell





¯ e  =
￿
Γ + ρ(1 − Γ)
￿2Στ¯ e , (19)
where ¯ e  ≡ 1
 
R
I  eidγ, Στ = Σg + Σt, and Γ =
Σg
Σg+Σt. If the government adopts a default option,
the maximum amount that an unskilled individual is willing to pay for the information sold by a
randomly selected skilled individual is
ν1 = ρ2Σt¯ e  = ρ2(1 − Γ)Στ¯ e. (20)
Unskilled individuals are willing to pay more to learn a skilled individual’s type when they
know that skilled individuals exert a lot of eﬀort to learn their own type, i.e., ν0 and ν1 are both
increasing in ¯ e. This makes sense as a fraction ¯ e  of the   skilled individuals will be informed in
equilibrium, while the other 1 − ¯ e  skilled individuals sell useless noise. From (19) and (20), we
can also see that unskilled individuals are willing to pay a higher price for a skilled individual’s
information when their type is highly variable (large Στ) and when it is more highly correlated
with that of other individuals (large ρ). This last result is consistent with the fact that, keeping Στ
ﬁxed, ν0 is increasing in Γ, as types are more correlated when the common component ˜ g accounts
for a larger portion of each individual’s type. This is also consistent with ν1 being decreasing in
Γ as, when the government announces ˜ g, the unknown portion of an individual’s type correlates
with someone else’s type only to the extent that the default option leaves uncertainty regarding ˜ ti.
In fact, using (19) and (20), it is straightforward to verify that ν0 > ν1 for a given total variance
Στ and aggregate level of eﬀort ¯ e . Indeed, because types are more correlated across individuals
when ˜ g is unknown, it is the case that unskilled individuals are willing to pay more to learn a
skilled individual’s type when there is no default option oﬀered by the government. As we shall see
below, this diﬀerence between ν0 and ν1 is exacerbated by the fact that the equilibrium eﬀort level
of skilled individuals is greater in the absence of a default option.
The price that a skilled individual will end up charging for his information will in general
depend on how much competition he faces from other information sellers or, alternatively, on how
easy it is for unskilled traders to consult another skilled individual. To capture these possibilities
in a tractable manner, we assume that each unskilled individual meets with one randomly selected
skilled individual, and that the economic surplus from their transaction is split as a Nash bargaining
outcome. More speciﬁcally, we assume that a skilled individual charges p = θνδ, where θ ∈ [0,1] and
δ = 1 if a default option is made available, for the information he sells to an unskilled individual.
When θ = 1 (θ = 0), the skilled (unskilled) individual extracts all the surplus from the transaction.
13Setting θ ∈ (0,1) allows us to capture any intermediate market power scenario. As the following
analysis shows, our results are unaﬀected by the size of θ, as money exchanges between individuals
cancel out in the total welfare function that the government seeks to maximize. We start with the
following result, which describes the equilibrium in the absence of a default option.
Proposition 6. If the government does not adopt a default option, then each skilled individual i ∈
I  chooses an eﬀort level ei =
Σg+Σt
c = Στ
c , and chooses xi = ˜ τi or xi = 0, depending on whether or
not he observes ˜ τi. Each unskilled individual j ∈ I \ I  purchases a signal ˜ sj = ˜ τ˜ ı from a randomly




¯ e ˜ sj =
￿
Γ + ρ(1 − Γ)
￿
¯ e ˜ sj. (21)
The skilled individuals’ behavior is the same as in section 2.1. In particular, their behavior
is not aﬀected by the possibility of reselling their information to unskilled agents. This is due
to the fact that unskilled agents cannot distinguish between skilled individuals who learn their
type and skilled individuals who do not. That is, they pay θν0 to the one skilled individual they
encounter, informed or not. As we see from (21), the extent to which unskilled individuals rely
on the information they purchase depends on its correlation with their type, as increases in ρ, Γ
and ¯ e  all ultimately lead to a higher correlation between ˜ sj and ˜ τj. The following result is the
analogue of Proposition 6 when the government makes a default option ˜ g available.
Proposition 7. If the government adopts a default option, then each skilled individual i ∈ I 
chooses an eﬀort level ei = Σt
c =
(1−Γ)Στ
c , and chooses xi = ˜ τi or xi = ˜ g, depending on whether or
not he observes ˜ τi. Each unskilled individual j ∈ I \ I  purchases a signal ˜ sj = ˜ τ˜ ı from a randomly
selected skilled individual ˜ ı ∈ I  for a price p = θν1, with ν1 given by (20), and chooses
xj = ˜ g + ρ¯ e (˜ sj − ˜ g). (22)
The comparative statics on the individuals’ choices with respect to Στ, ρ and ¯ e  are similar to
those in Proposition 6: more risk (large Στ) leads to more eﬀort, and more correlation (large ρ and
¯ e ) leads to heavier reliance on purchased information. When Γ is large, skilled individuals do not
gain much from learning their type perfectly, as the default option already reveals a large portion
of their type. As such, they work less. Although Γ aﬀects the information price (through ν1, as
shown in Lemma 3), it does not aﬀect the weight that unskilled individuals put on the information
they acquire from skilled individuals. Instead, they use the default option to remove the common
component included in the signal and only place weight on the idiosyncratic component. Finally,
14note that as in Proposition 1, the skilled individuals exert a higher level of eﬀort in the absence of a
default option since the incentive to gather information is stronger when they do not have a default
option to fall back on. This in turn causes the quality of their advice to decrease, and further
ampliﬁes the previously discussed diﬀerence between ν0 and ν1. That is, unskilled individuals do
not beneﬁt as much from a skilled individual’s information, and are thus inclined to pay less for it.
As in section 2, to assess the pros and cons of the government’s default option, we compare
total welfare with and without this option. In this case, welfare must be aggregated between skilled
and unskilled individuals. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The total welfare without a default option is
W
N = −(Σg + Σt) +
 
2c
(Σg + Σt)2 +
1 −  
c
(Σg + ρΣt)2. (23)
The total welfare with a default option is
W









In section 2, an increase in α enhances overall welfare through the larger information gathering
externalities that individuals have on each other. We can now see from (23) and (24) that increases
in ρ have a similar eﬀect in the presence of information sales. More precisely, straightforward





2(1 −  )
c






2(1 −  )
c
ρΣ2
t > 0. (26)
That is, a larger correlation across individuals’ types leads to more welfare when an advice channel,
like information sales, is incorporated. We can also see that the increase in welfare accommodated
by this advice channel is more important when a sizeable fraction of the population is unskilled (i.e.,
1−  is large). Finally, it is clear that (25) is greater than (26): the advice channel is more crucial,
and the role of ρ greater, when the government refrains from making a default option available, as
unskilled individuals can then rely only on the skilled agents’ information for their decisions.
The next proposition, which is our last result, is the analogue of Proposition 2 when we allow
for information sales.
15Proposition 8. The total welfare W
N without a default option is higher than the total welfare W
D
with a default option if the cost parameter c is in the following region:








  + 2(1 −  )ρ
￿
Σt. (27)





2(1 −  )
 
(2ρ − 1). (28)
As mentioned above, the role of ρ plays an especially important welfare role in information
sales when the government does not make a default option available. Proposition 8 formalizes
this by showing that ρ ≤ 1
2 always makes the availability of a default option optimal. That is,
unskilled individuals are better oﬀ learning the common component of their type perfectly from
the government when the information that can be acquired from other agents is not all that useful.
This implies that default options are especially valuable when the needs of an individual are unlikely
to be similar to those of his peers, including the ones who can advise him.
We can also see from (28) that default options are less valuable when Σt is large and Σg is
small, which is similar to our ﬁndings in section 2. The extent to which the government can
resolve the uncertainty faced by the population is still an important determinant of the usefulness
of default option. Interestingly, however, default options are more valuable when a larger fraction
of the population is skilled (large  ), even when ρ is large. This arises because the information
externalities that skilled individuals bring to the economy through information sales is limited: the
small number of unskilled individuals leads to a small number of information sales, and so the eﬀort
choices of skilled agents with and without a default option (as derived in Proposition 7) do not lead
to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent externalities.8
4 Concluding Remarks
Libertarian paternalism is an alluring idea because it combines two policies that appear incompat-
ible at ﬁrst glance, but work well together in many economic settings. However, one needs to be
cautious when implementing the ideals of such a policy in practice. As we show in our analysis, it
is not necessarily the paternalistic partner in this union that causes problems in the relationship.
8Note that an eﬀort cost function that includes, as in (2), an externality component in the information acquisition
process of the skilled individuals would mitigate this result. Indeed, α > 0 would lead to both skilled and unskilled
beneﬁtting from a more concerted information acquisition eﬀort.
16Rather, the freedom that participants exercise in the market may lead to side eﬀects that decrease
social welfare.
Indeed, as its name suggests, libertarian paternalism preserves the rights of individuals to
act in their own best interest, free-ride on each other’s eﬀort provision, and shirk in their own
responsibilities. In the face of non-cooperative incentives, libertarian paternalism may induce or
worsen externalities that decrease welfare, even though it does not explicitly force people to act in
a prescribed manner.
In the paper, we analyze a theoretical model to characterize one such distortion: information
acquisition and social learning. As Madrian and Shea (2001) demonstrate, default options have
information content, which participants may take into consideration when making key decisions.
Importantly, this may aﬀect incentives to gather further information, which in turn may alter the
success of information aggregation, either through social learning or information sales in the market.
We explore when libertarian paternalism is more or less likely to add value given this externality.
We show that default options are more likely to improve social welfare when acquiring information
is costly, information is not easily shared across individuals, and people are more heterogeneous in
their attributes or needs. Based on our model, default options will likely decrease welfare when the
government knows less about its constituents, when people are heterogeneous, and when the value
at stake in the decision is large.
Our analysis adds to previous work by Carroll et al. (2008) and increases our understanding of
default options and the implementation of libertarian paternalism through public recommendations
and advice. Further study of the externalities induced by libertarian paternalism are the subject
of future research, which appears warranted given the potential welfare import of this policy.
17Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Individual i must choose xi in order to maximize
E

















By diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to xi, we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition for this
problem, 2E
￿
˜ τi | Si
￿
− 2xi = 0, which yields xi = E
￿
˜ τi | Si
￿
. It is straightforward to verify that the
second-order condition is satisﬁed. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2
Let δ = 1 if the government announces a default option ˜ g and δ = 0 otherwise. Using Lemma 1,
individual i’s expected utility is given by
E
h












−(˜ τi − xi)2 | Si




























−(˜ τi − xi)2￿
= eiE
￿
−(˜ τi − ˜ τi)2￿
+ (1 − ei)δE
￿
−(˜ τi − ˜ g)2￿
+ (1 − ei)(1 − δ)E
￿
−(˜ τi − 0)2￿
= −(1 − ei)δΣt + −(1 − ei)(1 − δ)(Σg + Σt)
= −(1 − ei)
h
(1 − δ)Σg + Σt
i
.
The result obtains after we subtract the cost of eﬀort C(ei) for individual i, as given in (2). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in Lemma 2, each individual i chooses ei to maximize
−(1 − ei)
h






i − α¯ e2),
where δ = 1 when a default option ˜ g is oﬀered by the government and δ = 0 otherwise. The
ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
(1 − δ)Σg + Σt − cei = 0,
which implies that
ei =
(1 − δ)Σg + Σt
c
.
18It is easy to see that the second order condition is satisﬁed and thus the above ei corresponds to a
maximum. The eﬀort levels with and without a default option, (4) and (5), are obtained by setting
δ equal to one and zero respectively. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
A simple comparison of (6) and (7) yields the second inequality in (8). The ﬁrst inequality
in (8) comes from Assumption 1. The region is non-empty if and only if




which simpliﬁes to the condition in (9). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
















Σg+Σt = (1−δ)Σg+Σt, where δ =
Σg
Σg+Σǫ. Thus, when
individual i’s information set is Si = {˜ s} at the time of his decision about xi, Lemma 1 implies that
xi = δ˜ s. When individual i observes his type and Si = {˜ τi}, then he chooses xi = ˜ τi, as before. At
the time of his eﬀort decision, individual i’s information set is S0
i = {˜ s}, and thus
E
h












−(˜ τi − xi)2 | Si























−(˜ τi − ˜ τi)2￿
+ (1 − ei)E
￿
−(˜ τi − δ˜ s)2 | ˜ s
￿
= −(1 − ei)Var
￿
˜ τi | ˜ s
￿
= −(1 − ei)
h
(1 − δ)Σg + Σt
i
.
Therefore, each individual i chooses ei to maximize
E
h
˜ Ui(xi) − C(ei) | S0
i
i
= −(1 − ei)
h






i − α¯ e2).
The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
(1 − δ)Σg + Σt − cei = 0,
which leads to (14). It is easy to verify that the second-order condition is satisﬁed. ￿
19Proof of Proposition 4
The ﬁrst inequality in (16) comes from Assumption 1. Let us deﬁne ∆W(Σǫ) ≡ W
N −W
D(Σǫ).







Σg(2Σǫ + Σg) + 2Σt(Σǫ + Σg)
￿
− 2c(Σǫ + Σg)
o
2c(Σǫ + Σg)2 .
This quantity is positive if and only if the second inequality in (16) is satisﬁed. For the region in
(16) to be non-empty, we must have









which produces condition (17). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5


























ΣgΣt + Σǫ(Σg + Σt)
￿
− c(Σǫ + Σg)
o
. (29)
If c > (1 + α)(Σg + Σt), this derivative is always negative and it is optimal to set Σǫ as low as
possible, that is, Σ∗
ǫ = 0. If c < (1+α)Σt, the above derivative is always positive and it is therefore
optimal to set Σǫ as high as possible, that is Σ∗
ǫ = ∞, which is equivalent to the government not
oﬀering a default option. Finally, if (1 + α)Σt < c < (1 + α)(Σg + Σt), then (29) is greater than
zero when
Σǫ >
c − (1 + α)Σt
(1 + α)(Σg + Σt) − c
Σg,
and smaller than zero otherwise. This means that the maximum can only be achieved at Σǫ = 0
(i.e., default option without noise) or Σǫ = ∞ (i.e., no default option). The optimal default choice
must therefore be the same as in Proposition 2, leading to (18). ￿
20Proof of Lemma 3
Let ˜ sj denote the information purchased by unskilled individual j from skilled individual i, and
let us ﬁrst consider the case in which the government does not make a default option available. If
˜ sj = ˜ g +˜ ti, then the reduction in variance experienced by individual j from knowing ˜ sj is given by
Var
￿




˜ g + ˜ tj | ˜ g + ˜ ti
￿
= (Σg + Σt) −
￿








where we use the projection theorem to calculate the expression in square brackets. If ˜ sj is pure
noise, then individual j does not experience a reduction in variance. Since a fraction ¯ e  of the skilled
traders learn their type, the unconditional reduction in variance experienced by individual j from
learning individual i’s information is
(Σg+ρΣt)2
Σg+Σt ¯ e , which can be rewritten as
￿
Γ + ρ(1 − Γ)
￿2Στ¯ e 
using the fact that Σg = ΓΣτ and Σt = (1 − Γ)Στ. Since this quantity represents the increase in
expected utility enjoyed by individual j as a result of knowing ˜ sj, this is the maximum price that
he is willing to pay for it. The case in which the government makes a default option available is
similarly derived. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6
Let ˜ πi denote the proﬁts that a skilled individual i ∈ I  generates from selling information to
unskilled individuals. With an information price p = θν0, the 1 −   unskilled individuals will pay
a total sum of (1 −  )p = (1 −  )θν0 to acquire signals from the   skilled agents. Since these







(1 −  )θν0
 
.
Thus, using the same notation and reasoning as in Lemma 2, this skilled individual i must choose
ei in order to maximize
E
h
˜ Ui(xi) − C(ei) + ˜ πi
i





(1 −  )θν0
 
.
Because the last term in this expression is not aﬀected by this individual’s choice of ei, the ﬁrst-
order and second-order conditions for this maximization problem are identical to those in the proof
of Proposition 1, and so lead to ei =
Σg+Σt
c . After purchasing ˜ sj from a skilled agent, unskilled
individual j must choose xj in order to maximize E
￿
−(˜ g+˜ tj−xj)2|˜ sj
￿




˜ g + ˜ tj | ˜ sj
￿
= ¯ e E
￿
˜ g + ˜ tj | ˜ sj = ˜ g + ˜ ti
￿
+ (1 − ¯ e )E
￿








21where the last equality is obtained using the projection theorem. Using the fact that Σg = ΓΣτ
and Σt = (1 − Γ)Στ, we can rewrite this last expression as xj =
￿
Γ + ρ(1 − Γ)
￿
¯ e ˜ sj. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7
Let ˜ πi denote the proﬁts that a skilled individual i ∈ I  generates from selling information to
unskilled individuals. With an information price p = θν1, the 1 −   unskilled individuals will pay
a total sum of (1 −  )p = (1 −  )θν1 to acquire signals from the   skilled agents. Since these







(1 −  )θν1
 
.
Thus, using the same notation and reasoning as in Lemma 2, this skilled individual i must choose
ei in order to maximize
E
h
˜ Ui(xi) − C(ei) + ˜ πi
￿ ￿ ˜ g
i





(1 −  )θν1
 
.
Because the last term in this expression is not aﬀected by this individual’s choice of ei, the ﬁrst-
order and second-order conditions for this maximization problem are identical to those in the proof
of Proposition 1, and so lead to ei = Σt
c . After purchasing ˜ sj from a skilled agent, unskilled
individual j must choose xj in order to maximize E
￿
−(˜ g + ˜ tj − xj)2 | ˜ g, ˜ sj
￿




˜ g + ˜ tj | ˜ g, ˜ sj
￿
= ˜ g + ¯ e E
￿
˜ tj | ˜ g, ˜ sj = ˜ g + ˜ ti
￿
+ (1 − ¯ e )E
￿




= ˜ g + ¯ e ρ(˜ sj − ˜ g),
where the last equality is obtained using the projection theorem. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose ﬁrst that there is no default option. From the proof of Proposition 6, we know that
the welfare of any one skilled individual i ∈ I  is given by
W
N





(1 −  )p
 
.
The welfare of any one unskilled individual i ∈ I \ I  is given by
W
N
i = −(Σg + Σt) + ν0 − p,





















−(Σg + Σt) + ν0
i
dγ










dγ + (1 −  )ν0.
In equilibrium, we know from Proposition 6 that ei = ¯ e  =
Σg+Σt
c , p = θν0, and ν0 =
(Σg+ρΣt)2
Σg+Σt ¯ e .
After using these expressions in the total welfare function above, we get
W
N = −(Σg + Σt) +  
h










which simpliﬁes to (23). The calculations are similar with the default option. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8
A simple comparison of (23) and (24) yields the second inequality in (27). The ﬁrst inequality
in (27) comes from Assumption 1. The region is non-empty if and only if








  + 2(1 −  )ρ
￿
Σt,
which simpliﬁes to the condition in (28). ￿
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